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Abstract
The creation of a preferential trade area (PTA) or the deepening of an existing one can affect
adversely excluded countries and induce them to join or create a new PTA [Baldwin, 1993]. One
such adverse effect is trade diversion, the shift of imports from countries outside the preferential
trade area toward member countries. This paper investigates empirically whether countries
whose exports are more likely to suffer from trade diversion exhibit a higher likelihood of forming
a PTA. I derive a measure of the potential of trade diversion from the trade complementarity
index of Michaely [1962] and estimate a dynamic probit model of new PTAs formed between
1961 and 2005. The results show that countries facing a larger potential of trade diversion are
more likely to form a PTA in the future. The results also support the natural trading partner
hypothesis according to which preferential trade agreements are more likely to be formed among
countries that are predisposed to trade a lot.
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1 Introduction
The proliferation of Preferential Trade Agreements (PTAs) is one of the major phenomena in the
multilateral trading system over the recent decades. As of June 2014, the World Trade Organization
(WTO) has received some 585 notifications of regional trade agreements, of which 379 were in
force.1 Surprisingly, this recourse to regionalism is taking place at a time when world trade flows
have reached unprecedent levels, prompting some interrogations about whether they are stumbling
blocks or stepping stones to a world of globally free trade (see for instance Frankel and Wei [1996],
Lima˜o [2006] or Bhagwati [2008]).2
The empirical analysis usually focuses on their long-term determinants. Baier and Bergstrand
[2004] found that the potential welfare gains and the probability of PTA formation between two
countries are higher for countries that are closer in distance, remote from the rest of the world,
larger and more similar economically, and predisposed to gain from their comparative advantage.3
These findings support the natural trading partner hypothesis according to which preferential trade
agreements are formed along the lines of countries that are naturally predisposed to trade largely
with each other (see Wonnacott and Lutz [1989], Krugman [1991] and Frankel et al. [1995]). In
this view, the decline in transportation cost observed over the last decades is consistent with the
proliferation of preferential trade agreements.
The domino theory, an alternative explanation proposed by Baldwin [1993, 1995, 1999] suggests
that the trade discrimination faced by excluded countries following the creation of a PTA or the
deepening of an existing one can induce them to join or form new agreements. Egger and Larch
[2008] (hereafter EL) attempted to address this view by investigating the role of interdependence
in PTA formation and enlargement. Interdependence is captured by a measure of geographical
proximity of the country-pair contemplating forming a PTA to existing preferential trade areas.
Their results suggest that preferential trade agreements that are geographically close are more likely
to induce excluded countries to join or seek similar arrangements.
This paper extends their approach to explore a specific channel of interdependence in PTA
formation: the diversion of imports away from a non-member partner to a PTA partner. This
typically occurs if the duty-free imports from the member partner turn out to be cheaper than
1Goods, services and accessions were counted separately. WTO online information, viewed at:
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop e/region e/region e.htm.
2See also Frankel [1997, chap. 10] or World Bank [2000, chap. 5].
3Magee [2003] found similar results and also that countries are more likely to be preferential trading partners if
they have significant bilateral trade.
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imports from the non-member.4 The granting of trade preferences creates an asymmetry between
firms inside the PTA and firms from the excluded countries, resulting in a loss of exports of the
latter. And the more the excluded country exports products that PTA members can import from
each other, the higher the risk trade discrimination.
I adapt the trade complementarity index developed by Michaely [1962] to derive a measure of
the exposure to such discrimination: the potential of trade diversion. In this context, the index
captures to what extent products exported by a country-pair match products that PTA members
import from each other. The closer the match, the higher the potential of trade diversion. Using
this measure for PTAs that are geographically proximate to the country-pair, I estimate a probit
model using five-year interval panel data sets of 161 countries covering the period 1961-2005. The
results support the view that country-pairs that are more likely to suffer from trade diversion have
a significantly higher probability of forming a PTA. The effect is robust to controlling for EL’s
measure of interdependence, which is based on geographical proximity with existing PTAs. Also
consistent with existing studies, results show that natural trading partners are more likely to form
a PTA.
This paper relates to the literature investigating the determinants of PTA formation. Most
of the analysis on the “domino theory” are in the context of European countries. In one the
introductory papers to the domino theory, Baldwin [1995] discussed some evidence on the domino
effect in PTA formation. He argued that the European Community’s Single Market Programme
constitutes a special threat to countries from the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) because
a majority of their exports went to the EC market. This threat may have triggered a “domino
effect” leading successively Austria, Sweden, Finland, Norway and Switzerland to seek membership.
This was confirmed empirically by Sapir [2001] who was one of the first attempts to take the domino
theory to the data.
Baldwin and Rieder [2007] explored empirically the role of trade diversion in the demand of
membership for European Union (EU) accession. They captured the domino effect using two
variables. The first variable reflects the importance of the EU bloc as a trading partner to the
country and is the share of the country’s exports that go to EU countries. The second variable
captures the deepening of the EU and is a measure of the degree of participation of countries to EU
4Such diversion is harmful for the importing country if the pre-tax imports from the excluded country is cheaper
than the pre-tax imports from the PTA partner: it is as if the importing country is subsidizing imports from its PTA
partner. This effect is coined by Viner [1950] as trade diversion. This side of trade diversion is one of the effects of
trade preferences that is covered extensively in the literature. It is so because it is a loss for the world trading system
as well since trade is displaced from an efficient supplier to a non efficient supplier.
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institutions. They found that both variables have a positive impact on the likelihood of joining the
EU. Baldwin and Jaimovich [2010] explored the “contagion” effect in PTA formation, that is the
extent to which countries tend to seek PTAs with partners that already have PTAs with their major
trading partners. Borrowing from the literature on financial crisis contagion, they used a contagion
index that is, for a given country-pair, the share of exports of the reference country that goes to
third countries with whom the partner country has a trade deal. They found the contagion effect
to be important in PTA formation. The main departure from these papers is that the measure of
interdependence variable is not based on aggregate bilateral trade flows. I exploit the availability
of product-level data to measure to what extent excluded countries are exporting products that
can be prone to trade diversion.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section reviews the literature on the economic
effects of PTAs and describes the hypothesis tested in the paper. Section 3 lays out the empirical
model, discusses the variables used and the data set. Section 4 presents the results and section 5
concludes.
2 Evidence on trade diversion and hypothesis of the study
2.1 Trade effects of preferential trade agreements
Since the pioneering work of Viner [1950], the analysis of the economic effects of preferential trade
agreements is usually framed in terms of trade creation and trade diversion. There is trade creation
when, as a result of trade preferences, imports from a member country replace goods that used to
be produced domestically. This leads to an increased efficiency within the preferential trade area as
the partner country proves to be a lower-cost producer compared to domestic producers. Although
domestic producers will suffer a temporary loss because of competition from the PTA partner, the
resources freed can be used more efficiently in another sector where the home country has a relative
comparative advantage. In short, trade creation is welfare improving and therefore desirable.
Trade is diverted when imports are shifted away from an efficient non-member supplier to a less
efficient member supplier. This typically happens if the duty-free imports from the member country
is cheaper than the imports from the non-member partner. Although the domestic consumer is
paying less for the same goods, the surplus does not necessarily compensate for the loss in tariff
revenue and the importing country ends up being worse off. But the excluded country is also
affected as domestic firms are not competing on equal ground with firms in the preferential trade
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area.5 In such case, if it is not possible to join an existing PTA, affected countries may choose to
engage in a PTA with other outsiders to mitigate these effects.
In the literature, trade diversion is generally analyzed from the perspective of the PTA member:
the question of the desirability of a PTA boils down to a trade-off between its trade creating effect
(which is welfare increasing) and its trade diverting effect (which is welfare reducing).6 In this
paper, I take the view of the excluded country and define trade diversion to include broadly a loss
of exports due to the presence of a PTA. From the perspective of such country, it matters very
little whether the displacement of its exports is going to a more efficient producer or not. This can
induce the country either to reduce the price on its exports or to reallocate the resources used to
produced the exported goods to another sector. All those adjustments are costly and this cost may
feed pro-RTA pressures in order to mitigate those costs.
Although I am looking at trade diversion, it is important to note that there are circumstances
under which PTAs can increase trade from non-members. For example, a PTA can raise de-
mand for certain imports from the rest of the world due to complementarity, raising imports from
non-members. Also, PTAs can involve further opening of markets to international competition,
regulations and policies. The increased efficiency within the preferential trade area can lead to
higher income and therefore, larger demand from the rest of the world. I assume that such effects
are small compared to the negative externalities and therefore abstract from them.
2.2 Hypotheses
The hypotheses of the study are the following:
Hypothesis 1: Countries that face a higher potential of trade diversion due to the presence of
PTAs exhibit a higher probability of forming a PTA.
The potential of trade diversion is captured by a variable measuring to what extent products
exported by a country-pair are also traded within the preferential trade area. If firms from a
country-pair are exporting products that are traded heavily by PTA partners, they are more likely
to suffer from trade diversion because they are competing against domestic firms enjoying trade
preferences.
By focusing on trade diversion, I am investigating a specific aspect of the domino theory. The
theory as presented by Baldwin [1993] however does not refer only to trade diversion. It refers to
5This is also a cost for the world trading system as this trade is not along the lines of the comparative advantage.
6See Frankel et al. [1995] for an analysis of this trade-off in connection with the transportation costs. See also
Magee [2008] for a measure of trade creation and trade diversion.
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all political-economy forces that can emerge in the excluded country as a result of the formation
of a preferential trade area or its deepening. A preferential trade area represents a big market in
itself and even in absence of trade diversion, firms from excluded countries may increase lobbying
pressure in order to have access to the market. In addition, an increased efficiency within the
preferential trade area can raise demand from the rest of the world, but also its attractiveness, and
hence the incentives for excluded countries to seek similar deals.
Hypothesis 2: PTAs are more likely to be formed among natural trading partners.
This hypothesis emphasizes trade gains as a major determinant of preferential trade deals.
Natural trading partners are countries that were already trading a lot prior to the formation of the
PTA. This can be due to geographical proximity which is usually associated with low trade cost,
complementarity or relative levels of economic development. For such partners, the gains from
trade creation are likely to outweigh the loss from trade diversion as suggested by Krugman [1991].
A common proxy of whether countries are natural partners is their bilateral distance. This relies
on the fact that trade costs usually increase with bilateral distance and therefore, geographically
close countries can be considered as having relatively low trade costs.
3 Empirical analysis
The model of PTA formation is a qualitative choice model. Following EL, interdependence is
captured by an additional explanatory variable that is function of “ties” with existing PTAs. The
main departure from their paper is the measure of those ties. Below, I describe in more detail the
approach.
3.1 The econometric specification
Let N = n × n be the number of country-pairs and PTA?t a N × 1 vector of differential in utility
between membership and non-membership of a PTA. PTA?t is unobservable. Instead we observe
PTAt, which is a vector of dummies whose entries take the value of 1 for country-pairs that are
in a PTA in year t, including new PTAs (that is PTA?ij > 0) and 0 otherwise. I assume that the
differences in utility from forming a PTA are function of current and past economic conditions.
However, whether a country-pair forms a PTA or not depends on the value of such difference in
utility in the previous period. This reflects the fact that the formation of a PTA is typically a long
process and agreements entering currently into force are the outcomes of decision taken many years
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ago, and therefore triggered by conditions prevailing at that time.
The model of PTA formation is:
PTA?t−5 = ρWt−5PTAt−5 +Xt−5β + t (3.1)
newPTAt = 1
[
PTA?t−5 > 0
]
(3.2)
where
• Wt is a N × N matrix whose entry κ, τ captures the potential of trade diversion faced by
exports from country-pair κ = (κ1, κ2) in the country-pair τ = (τ1, τ2);
• Xt−5 is a N × k matrix of k regressors;
• β is a k × 1 vectors of parameters;
• t is a N × 1 vector of residual terms;
• newPTAt the N × 1 vector such that newPTAκt = 1 if the pair κ forms a new PTA in period
t and 0 if κ was not a PTA in t−5 and t. Continuing PTAs are excluded from the estimation
and the corresponding entry is set to a missing value.7
• 1[.] is the indicator function.
The effect of past PTAs on the current ones is captured by Wt−5PTAt−5, a variable placing
weight on country-pairs that are in a PTA in period t − 5. The measure gives more weight to
existing PTA at time t − 5 which are more likely to divert trade with the outsider country-pair.
The conjecture is that this trade diversion would encourage the outsider to form a PTA 5 years
later.
A few remarks are in order. First, in each period we are interested in the effect of pre-existing
PTAs on the new ones and the dependent variable is therefore restricted to country-pairs that were
not in a PTA in the previous period, that is PTAit−5 = 0. This is a restriction compared to EL who
estimated separate models for continuing PTAs, new PTAs and PTA enlargement. The restriction
however is without a loss of generality since their results did not change much across the three
7This trick is used only to keep the vectorial notation consistent. One way to avoid this is to make the dimension
of the matrices time-dependent.
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specifications. A consequence of this choice is that the number of observations for the dependent
variable is declining with time as continuing PTAs are dropped.8
Second, I abstract from short-term fluctuations in some of the independent variables by aggre-
gating the panel into 9 periods of five-year intervals covering the period 1961-2005. This has the
advantage of increasing the variability in the dependent variable: any agreement created during
one of the five years is considered as a PTA formation while the non-existence of such agreement for
all the five years is combined into one single observation of no agreement. Each period covers the
years {t− 2, . . . , t+ 2} with t taking values in {1963, 1968, 1973, 1978, 1983, 1988, 1993, 1998, 2003}.
With a little abuse of notation, I use the subscript t to denote the 5-year period, and t − 5 and
t+ 5 to denote respectively the previous and the next period.
The model defined by equations (3.1) and (3.2) belongs to the class of models with a spatially
lagged dependent variable. A frequent issue with these models is that the spatial lag is usually
endogenous and correlated to the error terms, leading to a bias in the coefficient estimates when
the endogeneity is not properly taken into account. This specification is however purely a space
recursive model as PTAt−5 is pre-determined at time t and there is no serial correlation in the
residuals [Ward and Gleditsch, 2008].
3.2 Construction of the weighting matrix W
The weighting matrix W is derived from TD, a matrix whose entries measure the potential of trade
diversion between country-pairs, and D a matrix of distances.
3.2.1 The potential of trade diversion TD
TD is a N ×N matrix measuring the potential of trade diversion faced by exports from a country-
pair κ in the market of another country-pair τ . To measure this potential, I adapt the trade
complementarity index developed by Michaely [1962]. The trade complementarity index was de-
veloped originally for comparing trade profiles at country levels: it shows how well the exports
structure (supply) of a country matches the imports profile (demand) of a partner. As such, it
provides a useful information on the prospects for bilateral trade.
I extend this logic at country-pair level to measure to what extent exports from a country-
pair are likely to suffer from trade diversion in another country-pair. The idea is the following:
8I assume that those are the only countries that can create a PTA in period t and by doing so, ignore the death
of PTAs. In practice, such events are rare in the sample.
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if countries {κi}i=1,2 are exporting to the world products that are similar to the ones countries
{τi}i=1,2 are importing from each other, the prospect of a trade deal between {τi} is potentially
harmful to exporters from {κi}. The granting of mutual tariff preferences renders bilateral imports
between τ1 and τ2 cheaper, creating an asymmetry between firms in κ and firms in τ : consumers
within the preferential trade area are likely to divert their demand away from κ1, κ2 to their PTA
partner. This asymmetry can nourish politico-forces for the creation of a PTA in κ1, κ2.
Formally, let xkκt be the share of product k in the aggregate exports of {κi}i=1,2 to the world and
mkτt the share of the same commodity in the imports of {τi}i=1,2 from each other. The potential of
trade diversion faced by exports from κ in the market of τ is defined as:
TDκτt = 1− 1
2
∑
k
∣∣∣xkκt −mkτt∣∣∣ (3.3)
The index ranges from 0 to 1, with 1 reflecting perfect complementarity between exports of
κ and bilateral imports of τ , and therefore a higher potentiality of trade diversion. The extreme
case where the index is zero reflects a situation in which none of the product exported by κ1, κ2
are traded between τ1 and τ2. In such case, there is no scope for trade diversion since firms from
κ do not have any competitor in τ . Note that the index is not symmetric: the potential of trade
diversion faced by exports from κ in the market τ is not the same as the potential of diversion
faced by exports of τ in κ.
3.2.2 Distance D:
The distance between two country-pairs κ and τ is defined as the average distance between all the
combinations of two countries from one pair and the other:
Dκτ =
1
4
2∑
i=1
2∑
j=1
DISTκiτj (3.4)
where DISTκiτj is the bilateral distance between countries κi and τj measured in kilometers (kms).
I use D here to restrict some entries of the weighting matrix W to zero because its construction
is computationally intense. For instance, with 161 countries, W is a 25, 921 × 25, 921 matrix and
the memory requirement becomes quickly an issue.
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3.2.3 The weighting matrix W
Given TDt and D, the weighting matrix Wt is defined by:
Wt = TDt × 1[D < 2000 kms] (3.5)
I restrict Wκτt to be zero for country-pairs that are more than 2,000 kms apart.
9 Rows of Wt
are normalized to sum to unity. The main departure from EL is the definition of the non-zero
entries of the weighting matrix. In their paper, it is based on the inverse distance (e−Dκτ/500) while
here, it is based on the potential for trade diversion.
3.3 Other Variables
The dependent variable newPTAijt is a binary indicator that takes the value of 1 if there is a
preferential trade agreement between countries i and j entering in force in period t, and 0 if
there is no PTA. As discussed previously, the country-pair ij is then dropped from the dependent
variable sample and the corresponding entry in the vector newPTA is set to a missing value. As a
consequence of this assumption, all the country-pairs that were in a PTA before 1961, the beginning
of the period of study were dropped from the analysis.10
The explanatory variables are:
• NATURAL (-) is the logarithm of the bilateral distance and captures the natural trading
partner hypothesis:
NATURALij = log DISTij
Thee idea is that countries that are closer geographically tend to have lower trade costs and
therefore can consume more of each other’s varieties. Hence, they have a natural predispo-
sition to trade largely with each other. A trade deal between such countries raises welfare
because it is likely to be more trade creating than trade diverting [Krugman, 1991].
• RGDPsum (+) is the sum of real GDP and captures the market size of the country-pair:
RGDPsumijt = log (RGDPit +RGDPjt)
where RGDPit and RGDPit are real GDP for i and j in year t. It is expected to affect
9This threshold is also used in Bergstrand et al.’s (2010) analysis of the timing of PTAs.
10They were re-included in the dependent variable only if the agreement has broken down.
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positively the probability of PTA formation: the larger the market size, the bigger is the
scope for trade gains because there are more varieties available for consumption and welfare is
increasing with varieties. In addition, there is room for greater competition and specialization.
• RGDPsim (+) measures the similarity between two countries in terms of the economic size:
RGDPsimijt = log
[
1−
(
RGDPit
RGDPit +RGDPjt
)2
−
(
RGDPjt
RGDPit +RGDPjt
)2]
The measure ranges from 0 to 1. An index close to 0 reflects an asymmetric country-pair:
one of the countries accounts for almost all of the pair’s GDP. On the other hand, a value
close to zero is indicative that the two countries are of similar size.
• DKL (+/-) is the absolute of the difference in real GDP per capita:
DKLijt = log
∣∣∣∣RGDPitPOPit − RGDPjtPOPjt
∣∣∣∣
There are opposite views on the relationship between income differences and the likelihood
of PTA formation. Krueger [1999] argued that a preferential trade agreement between a de-
veloped and a developing country is more likely to improve welfare than one between two
similar countries because similar countries have less scope for trade gains based on compara-
tive advantage.
However, from a political economy perspective, preferential trade agreements are more diffi-
cult between countries with large differences in income per capita because of possible political
opposition in the rich partner.11 An evidence supporting this argument is the formation of
the Canada-US free trade area (CUSTA) and the extension to Mexico (NAFTA). The ne-
gotiation of the free trade area between US and Mexico (which will lead to the creation of
the NAFTA) faced more opposition from the US House and Senate that the formation of the
CUSTA itself (see Beaulieu [2002]).
I also include the square of DKL to capture any nonlinearity in the relationship with income
per capita.
• REMOTE(+) measures to what extent a pair of continental trading partners are far from
11See Levy [1997] for a discussion of some political economy arguments.
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other countries:
REMOTEij = Continentij
1
2
log
∑
k 6=j
DISTik
n− 1
+ log
∑
k 6=i
DISTjk
n− 1

where Continentij = 1 if i and j are on the same continent and n, the number of countries.
Welfare of two continental trading partners increases with their remoteness from the rest of
the world. The variable takes the value of zero for countries located on different continents.
• DROWKL(+) is a measure of the relative factor endowment between a country-pair and the
rest of the world:
DROWLijt =
1
2
{∣∣∣∣∣
∑
k 6=iRGDPkt∑
k 6=i POPkt
− RGDPit
POPit
∣∣∣∣∣+
∣∣∣∣∣
∑
k 6=j RGDPkt∑
k 6=i POPkt
− RGDPjt
POPjt
∣∣∣∣∣
}
Note that Baier and Bergstrand [2004] use capital-labor ratios. However, due to the avail-
ability of data, I follow EL and use differences in real GDP per capita.
3.4 Econometric issues
A major issue with the specification in the equation 3.1 is the possible endogeneity of the right
hand side variables, especially variables derived from trade values. Since the formation of a PTA
takes typically several years during which bilateral ties may have become stronger, anticipation
of the trade agreement may increase bilateral trade flows even prior to the agreement itself. In
such case, variables derived from trade values are endogenous and correlated to the error term ij ,
leading to a bias in parameters.
Magee [2008] showed that there is a significant increase in trade during the four years leading
up to the beginning of the average FTA. Here, I take a five-year lagged value for regressors derived
from trade values, assuming that the impact of a prospective trade deal five years prior to its entry
into force is negligible.
3.5 Data sources and measurement issues
The analysis is based on a combination of a variety of data sets. The PTA dummy is obtained from
a comprehensive data set assembled by Baier and Bergstrand [2009]. Based on information from
the World Trade Organization among other sources, this data set covers 195 countries and provides
information on which countries are engaged in any kind of preferential trade arrangement between
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1960 and 2005. PTAs include, by increasing degree of integration, non reciprocal preferential trade
agreements given by developed nations to developing countries, preferential trade agreements, free
trade areas, customs unions, common markets and economic unions. I exclude non reciprocal PTAs
from the analysis and group all the others under the terminology of PTA.
Data on bilateral trade flows is from the NBER-United Nations Trade Data constructed by
Feenstra et al. [2005]. Combining data from Statistics Canada’s World Trade Database and the
United Nations Commodity Trade database (UN Comtrade), this database provides information on
bilateral imports at 4-digit Standard International Trade Classification (SITC), revision 2 for the
period 1962-2000. An interesting feature of this database is that they use primarily the trade flow
as reported by the importing country and adopt mirror statistics when such data is not available,
thereby increasing the coverage. In the calculation of the trade complementarity index, I aggregate
the data to obtain flows at 2-digit SITC level (divisions), yielding 73 items.
The bilateral distance measure is downloaded from the CEPII website.12 The dataset covers 225
countries and presents, among other distance between the most populated cities or agglomerations
in the countries calculated following the great circle formula. Data on real GDP and population
are obtained from the World Bank’s (2009) World Development Indicators. Real GDP corresponds
to GDP measured in 2000 US dollars.
4 Results
4.1 RTA formation and summary statistics
I start with some summary statistics about PTA formation over the period of study. Figure ??
presents the number of country-pairs that have formed a new PTA during each of the 5-years
periods from 1961 to 2005. Note that I do not differentiate between bilateral and multilateral
PTAs: any enlargement is considered as the creation of a PTA between the new member and each
of the existing member. This differs from EL who considered separately the formation of new PTAs
from the enlargement of existing ones.13
12http://www.cepii.fr/anglaisgraph/bdd/distances.htm.
13For instance, the accession of Greece to the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1981 is treated as the
creation of a bilateral PTA between Greece and each of the countries that were already member.
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Figure 1: Number of country-pairs forming a new PTA between 1961 and 2005
Over the whole period of 1961-2005, about 1,499 country-pairs have formed a PTA. From the
figure, it is possible to identify periods of active PTA formation and periods of relatively slow PTA
formation. For instance, between 1971 and 1975, about 220 country-pairs entered a PTA. This
reflects among others the formation of the Caribbean Community14 and the first enlargement of
the European Community with the accession of the United Kingdom, Ireland and Denmark. The
second wave of regionalism occured between 1981 and 1985. A major event during this period is the
accession of Greece to the EC and the establishment of the Gulf Cooperation Council as a common
market between Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates.
Another interesting fact from the figure is that since 1991-1995, the number of new country-
pairs forming a PTA remains high, well above 2000. For instance, 318 country-pairs formed a PTA
between 1991 and 1995. One could attribute this proliferation to the enlargement of major PTAs
such as the European Community because a single country joining one of these PTAs is treated as
the creation of as many bilateral PTAs as there are countries. This period is marked by several
free trade areas involving the European Community (former EEC) and countries such as Andorra,
Bulgaria, Czech and Slovakia, the creation of the Southern Common Market (Mercosur) in Latin
America and the creation of the Western Africa Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU).
However, this was also a period of dynamic regionalism with countries moving towards bilateral
trade agreements as well. An indicator that would not be prone to the effect of the enlargement
of large preferential trade areas is the number of PTAs notified to the WTO. Such number is not
14The Caribbean Community was established in 1973 as a customs union between Barbados, Guyana, Jamaica,
and Trinidad and Tobago. Seven countries will join the next year, raising the number of members to 11. These are:
Antigua and Barbuda, Belize, Dominica, Grenada, Montserrat, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia and Saint Vincent
and the Grenadines. Suriname will join later in 1995 and Haiti in 2002.
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affected by the size of multilateral PTAs since bilateral PTAs and multilateral PTAs are counted
identically. A study by Crawford and Fiorentino [2005] reported that from 1995 to 2005, 196 new
PTAs have been notified to the World Trade Organization, compared to 124 PTAs during the 4
decades of the GATT era. The figure clearly suggests that if there is interdependence, the effects
must have been stronger over the last two decades.
Table 1: Summary statistics
no PTA new PTAs
NATURAL 8.865 7.529
RGDPsum 24.345 24.650
RGDPsim -2.392 -1.707
DKL 1.841 1.256
square DKL 5.021 2.377
REMOTE 1.744 6.815
DRWOWKL -0.245 -0.242
Table 1 presents some summary statistics on the explanatory variables included in the study.
Statistics are presented for two sub-samples: country-pairs that are not in a PTA country-pairs that
form a new PTA. It shows that countries that form a new PTA are relatively close (NATURAL)
and larger compared to the others (RGDPsum). PTAs are also more likely to be observed between
countries that are more similar in terms of GDP (RGDPsim) or GDP per capita (DKL). The
statistics are descriptive and only indicative of the association between our explanatory variables
and PTA formation in the sample.
4.2 Estimation results
Table 2 presents the results of the panel data model estimation of the determinants of PTA forma-
tion. I report the results under three different specifications. All these specification differ in the
weighting matrix used to capture interdependence.
In Column (1) I report the results in a basic specification that does not take into account
interdependence, that is, all the elements of Wt−5 are set to zero. In column (2), I use the distance-
based weighting matrix as in EL. It is therefore a replication of their results although I do not
differential between PTA formation and PTA enlargement.15 Column (3) presents results in the
case where the weighting matrix is based on the measure of the potential of trade diversion.
15Another key difference is that they treat multilateral PTAs as a single country.
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Comparing across the specifications, the effects of the common variables are unchanged and
in general, not qualitatively different from the other studies such as Baier and Bergstrand [2004]
or EL. The results confirm the importance of natural trading partners in PTA formation. The
coefficient on the natural logarithm of the bilateral distance in negative and highly significant,
suggesting that PTAs are more likely to be formed among countries that are geographically close.
I also find that PTAs are more likely to be formed between larger countries (βˆRGDPsum > 0) and
also countries that are of similar size in terms of their GDP share (βˆRGDPsim > 0).
Turning to income differences, I find a positive effect of the difference in income per capita
on the probability of PTA formation. However, the coefficient of the square term is negative and
significant, suggesting that the relationship is in fact non linear. This is in favor of Krueger’s (1999)
logic of trade gains based on comparative advantage for countries with different levels of income
per capita. EL found a negative coefficient on the difference in GDP per capita and a positive one
on the squared-term. The results is however not robust since results from the cross-sectional probit
show the reverse sign.
Considering variables measuring the situation of the country-pair compared to the rest of the
world, I find that a pair of remote countries (but located on the same continent) are more likely to
form a PTA (βREMOTE > 0). This support the argument of Frankel et al. [1995] that the welfare
from forming a PTA between such pair of countries is higher because there is less scope for trade
diversion with the rest of the world. The reason is that such pair of countries is already trading
less with the rest of the world because they are more likely to face higher transport costs with such
partners.
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Table 2: Panel Probit results for the probability of a new
PTA, 1966 and 2005
Dependent variable: newPTAs
(1) (2) (3)
Wt−5PTAt−5
Trade diversion 1.762**
-0.15
Distance-based 2.492**
-0.208
NATURAL -0.820** -0.733** -0.684**
-0.036 -0.036 -0.036
RGDPsum 0.206** 0.217** 0.192**
-0.014 -0.015 -0.014
RGDPsim 0.190** 0.197** 0.177**
-0.018 -0.02 -0.018
DKL 0.236** 0.216** 0.193**
-0.06 -0.064 -0.06
square DKL -0.110** -0.112** -0.103**
-0.017 -0.018 -0.017
REMOTE 0.037** 0.041** 0.037**
-0.005 -0.005 -0.005
DRWOWKL -0.031** -0.030** -0.030**
-0.011 -0.012 -0.011
Constant -0.229 -1.435** -1.115**
-0.335 -0.373 -0.341
Pseudo-R2 0.361 0.377 0.374
Observations 54 113 54 113 54 113
Nb of country-pairs 11 893 11 893 11 893
Notes: Standard errors are reported below the coefficients.
∗ significant at 5%; ∗∗ significant at 1%.
I now turn to the interdependence variables. Consistent with EL’s finding, country-pairs that
are geographically close to PTAs are more likely to form a PTA themselves (column (2)). The
coefficient estimate is 2.42 and significant at 1 percent level, a value that is within the the range
of their estimates. Results in column (3) point to a significant impact of the potential of trade
diversion on the likelihood of two countries forming a PTA. I find a point estimate coefficient
of 1.76, supporting the view that countries that face a higher risk of trade diversion due to the
presence of neighboring preferential trade agreements are more likely to enter a PTA themselves
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the following years. The coefficient is significant at 1 percent level. To measure the goodness-of-fit
of the model, I report the pseudo R2. For the model with interdependence, the pseudo R2 is 0.37,
suggesting that the model “explains” about 37 percent of variation in the formation of new PTAs.16
4.3 Robustness check
The measure of trade diversion shares a common feature with EL’s distance-based measure: it uses
the same criteria to select country-pairs considered as geographically close. Hence, it is possible
that the results are driven by a common determinant: distance. To show that this is not the case,
I consider alternative specifications including both measures.
Table 3: Panel estimation of PTA formation: marginal effects
Dependent variable: newPTA
(1A) (1B) (2A) (2B) (3A) (3B)
Prob. Marg. Prob. Marg. Prob. Marg.
Wt−5PTAt−5
Trade diversion 0.799** 0.003** 0.0004** 1.175** 0.005**
-0.211 0.002 0.00009 -0.281 0.002
Distance-based 1.814** 0.007** 0.0005** 2.037** 0.009**
-0.273 0.001 0.00011 -0.296 0.002
Interaction of both 4.042** -1.688
-0.397 -0.866
Notes: Standard errors are reported below the coefficients.
∗ significant at 5%; ∗∗ significant at 1%.
As can be seen from columns (1A) and (3A), the coefficient on the trade-diversion based in-
terdependence variable is positive, supporting the view that this measure captures more than
geographical proximity with existing PTAs. The coefficient on the distance-based weighting matrix
is however higher, suggesting the predominance of distance in PTA formation. It is important to
note that the two effects are not exclusive. For instance, one can think about the trade-diversion
based measure as important in inducing countries to seek a PTA, and the distance-based measure
as important in their choice of the PTA partner.
The importance of the two determinants is confirmed in columns (1B), (2B) and (3B) reporting
the marginal effects of each of the measures. The marginal effects are calculated at the mean
of the independent variables and correspond to the effect of these variables on the probability of
16The pseudo R2 is calculated as one minus the ratio of the log-likelihood value for the estimated model to that
for the model with only an intercept.
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a positive outcome. Although these variables are not measuring any economic quantity and the
interpretation of their coefficient in isolation does not make much sense, their relative magnitude
can be informative. These results show that the interdependence measure based on trade diversion
is economically significant, even when distance is controlled for. The marginal effect is significant
but roughly half of the effect of the distance-based measure.
Table 3 shows the results of the probit estimation and the marginal effects under three different
specifications. I consider a specification including distance-based and trade diversion potential-
based measures of interdependence (column (1A)), a specification including only the interaction of
the two measures (column (2A)), and a specification including both measures, together with their
interaction term (column (3A)). Although included in all the three specifications, the coefficients
on the other explanatory variables are not reported to save space.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, I extend Egger and Larch [2008] to explore the role of trade diversion in PTA
formation. Using product-level trade data, I derive an index capturing to what extent products
exported by excluded countries are likely to suffer from trade diversion in preferential trade areas.
The index measures the similarity between products exported by the outsiders and products that
PTA members import from each other. The closer the match, the higher the potential of trade
diversion. I find a significant effect of the threat of trade diversion on the probability of PTA
formation. The result is robust to controlling for distance-based measure of interdependence. The
results support also the importance of the natural trading partner hypothesis in PTA formation,
that is, countries that are closer geographically exhibit a higher probability of entering a PTA.
This paper focuses on a particular aspect of interdependence in PTA formation: trade diversion.
However, there are several other aspects that worth exploring, one of them being the terms of trade
effects [Kowalczyk and Riezman, 2009, Winters and Chang, 2000]. In addition, as suggested by
Baldwin [1993], the deepening of an existing PTA can induce excluded countries to seek similar
arrangements as well. All those aspects are left for future research.
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